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A comprehensive system for national secu-
rity and defense against terror threats must 
include biosecurity elements. The latter 
must encompass guidelines and regulations 
for monitoring and controlling the use of 
potentially infectious biothreat agents by 
investigators, laboratories, or research insti-
tutions. Molecular techniques to aid and 
enhance this monitoring effort could greatly 
strengthen biosecurity systems. Here, we sug-
gest that natural or induced genomic poly-
morphisms in research strains of infectious 
agents may provide “inherent watermarks 
(IWs)” by which agents can be monitored 
and tracked. In addition, we describe meth-
ods by which the integrity of an IW system 
can be maintained in the context of a decen-
tralized research infrastructure.
We recently proposed an infectious 
agent control and tracking system that 
employs genetically engineered, synthetic, 
strain-specific DNA sequences – “synthetic 
watermarks (SWs)” – that allow organisms 
associated with a particular research entity 
to be distinguished from those of others 
in the research community (Jupiter et al., 
2010). In the event of release, the offending 
pathogen can be interrogated for the pres-
ence of a registered SW. If such a watermark 
is present, then information about the pos-
sible source becomes immediately available. 
The SW system requires the designation of 
a trusted authorizing entity to ensure that 
SWs, and the strains that carry them, are 
managed appropriately. The authorizing 
entity is charged with distributing organ-
isms containing unique SW sequences to 
individual research entities, cataloging 
existing SWs, and acting as an intermediary 
in the sharing of watermarked agents.
The SW system is attractive because it pro-
vides a framework that can potentially reduce 
the possibility of mistaken source assignment 
in the event of malicious or accidental release 
of an infectious agent. In addition, a proactive 
effort by the research community to develop 
watermarking strategies provides an oppor-
tunity to restore the public’s confidence in 
research entities working with highly infec-
tious agents, which had become tarnished 
due to the still unresolved anthrax release 
case. However, the reliance of the SW system 
on the use of genetically tractable organisms 
raised several concerns. For example, the 
approach is costly because each organism 
requires individualized watermarking, which 
in turn, requires specialized expertise and 
organism-specific reagents for the genomic 
integration of the synthetic DNA sequences. 
In addition, many infectious agents are not 
genetically tractable, and hence, cannot be 
monitored under an SW system.
To address these issues, we propose 
here a novel approach that exploits IWs 
to monitor and track infectious agents 
(Figure 1). An IW is a virtual string of 
strain-specific polymorphic sequences 
(e.g., single nucleotide polymorphisms, 
insertions, deletions, inversions) that are 
embedded within the genome of an infec-
tious agent. Like an SW, an IW provides 
a mechanism by which a unique genomic 
sequence (and corresponding strain) can 
be linked to a specific research entity. 
However, unlike its SW counterpart, an 
IW is a virtual signature that is computa-
tionally assembled following the analysis of 
the whole genome sequence of a particular 
strain of an agent. A watermarking system 
based on IWs therefore combines insights 
about natural or induced genetic variation 
in research strains with next generation 
sequencing technology (NGS) to circum-
vent the genetic engineering of research 
strains that is required in an SW system 
(Metzker, 2010).
Manifold strategies for implementing 
an IW strategy can be envisioned. However, 
these strategies will likely share several key 
components. First,  spontaneous or induced 
mutant variants of a particular reference 
strain of an infectious agent will be gener-
ated and sequenced by an approved entity. 
Strains that not only possess genome 
sequences that are sufficiently different 
from one another to support an IW strat-
egy but also are phenotypically equivalent 
(e.g., as tested by mixed infection with 
wild-type strains) to the parent strains, will 
be identified, cataloged, and distributed to 
participating research laboratories.
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
for using and sharing of IW strains will 
need to be devised and implemented. 
First, SOPs that provide for the moni-
toring of the integrity of the IWs in dis-
tributed laboratory strains are required. 
Although information about mutation 
rates in a few model organisms has been 
collected (Mukai, 1964; Kibota and Lynch, 
1996; Keightley and Caballero, 1997; 
Wloch et al., 2001; Loewe et al., 2003), 
the amount of genetic variation for many 
biothreat agents has not been empirically 
determined. Moreover, how individual 
laboratory practices impact the selection 
of mutations is unknown. In addition, the 
expected stability of mutations will need 
to be experimentally determined in each 
model system. However, not all mutations 
need to be included in the virtual water-
mark. For example, mutations associated 
with genetic hotspots may be omitted 
because of the possibility of reversion 
and the consequent introduction of noise 
into the watermark signature. That said, a 
robust watermarking system would be tol-
erant of mutations that introduce a back-
ground rate of noise in the system. Second, 
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strains. As costs of NGS declines, the cost 
of  implementing a centralized IW system 
may also be lower than a corresponding 
system that relies on engineering SWs in 
genetically tractable organisms.
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the authorizing entity. The watermarked 
strain can then be delivered to the recipient 
laboratory for phenotypic testing and use. 
Finally, an IW system can be supported by 
either a centralized or decentralized man-
agement system. In a centralized system, a 
controlling authorizing entity is respon-
sible for inducing mutations, computa-
tionally verifying IWs, and  distributing 
strains to participating investigators, labs, 
or  institutions. In a decentralized system, 
the burden of sequencing and mutagen-
esis falls to the individual research enti-
ties, and the authority entity’s role is 
limited to computational verification and 
assignment of IWs. In both settings, labs 
participate in the phenotypic verification 
of watermarked strains. The centralized 
approach would have the advantage of 
 supporting standardized protocols for all 
for the integrity of the IW system to be 
maintained, protocols for sharing strains 
among community members would need 
to be implemented. In the event of sharing 
strains among labs, where uniqueness of 
watermarks is not maintained, assignment 
of strain to lab of origin cannot be done. 
Given that sharing of strains is critical to 
scientific research, we are presented with 
the question: can an IW system be suc-
cessfully employed in such a setting? One 
way to address this need would be to task 
the authorizing entity with ensuring the 
appropriate transfer of reagents. In this 
case, the authorizing entity passages strains 
or induces mutations to generate new IWs 
in the genomes of the transferred material. 
The presence of the new IW can be verified 
by whole genome sequencing, confirmed 
by in silico modeling, and registered with 
Figure 1 | Centralized vs. decentralized management of an iW 
watermarking system. (A) In a decentralized system the central authorizing 
entity takes responsibility for sequence analysis and strain assignment, after 
labs have sequenced genomes and induced mutations. Research entities collect 
candidate strains, verify phenotypic neutrality, deposit optimal strains with a 
strain repository, and then perform experiments with authorized, phenotypically 
neutral strains carrying IWs. (B) In the centralized system the centralized 
authorizing entity determines the whole genome sequence of candidate strains, 
induces mutations, assigns and distributes strains to research entities, and 
collects authorized, phenotypically neutral strains carrying IWs from the same 
for deposition in a strain repository. Research entities verify 
phenotypic neutrality.
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